State v. Nichols Appellant\u27s Brief Dckt. 38123 by unknown
UIdaho Law
Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law
Idaho Supreme Court Records & Briefs
4-28-2014
State v. Nichols Appellant's Brief Dckt. 38123
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.uidaho.edu/
idaho_supreme_court_record_briefs
This Court Document is brought to you for free and open access by Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in Idaho
Supreme Court Records & Briefs by an authorized administrator of Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law. For more information, please contact
annablaine@uidaho.edu.
Recommended Citation
"State v. Nichols Appellant's Brief Dckt. 38123" (2014). Idaho Supreme Court Records & Briefs. 3977.
https://digitalcommons.law.uidaho.edu/idaho_supreme_court_record_briefs/3977
SARA B. THOMAS 
State Appellate Public Defender 
I.S.B.#5867 
ERIK R. LEHTINEN 
Chief, Appellate Unit 
I.S.B. #6247 
SARAH E. TOMPKINS 
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender 
1.8.8. #7901 
3050 N. Lake Harbor Lane, Suite 100 
Boise, ID 83703 
(208) 334-2712 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO 
















ELMORE COUNTY NO. CR 2009-4407 
APPELLANT'S BRIEF 
IN SUPPORT OF 
PETITION FOR REVIEW 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Timothy Nichols asks the Idaho Supreme Court to review the opinion of the Idaho 
Court of Appeals, 2014 Opinion No. 6 (Ct. App. February 24, 2014) (hereinafter, 
Opinion). He asks that this Court grant his petition for review because this case deals 
with issues of first impression and because the underlying opinion by the Idaho Court of 
Appeals is likely in conflict with prior precedent from this Court. 
1 
Statement of the Facts & Course of Proceedings 
Mr. Nichols was charged by information with statutory rape. (R., pp.17-18.) 
Thereafter, the State filed a motion in limine with the district court seeking to preclude 
Mr. Nichols from raising any defense to this charge with regard to either mistake of age 
or consent. (R., pp.33-36.) The State asserted that any such defenses would be 
irrelevant to the charge of statutory rape under I.R. 401 in light of Idaho case law that 
indicated that neither mistake of age or consent can stand as a defense to an allegation 
of rape pursuant to I.C. § 18-6101(1). (R., pp.33-36.) 
At the hearing on the State's motion in limine, Mr. Nichols addressed two sets of 
concerns with regard to his case: first, he asserted that he should be allowed to raise 
the defenses of good faith mistake as to age and consent against the charge of 
statutory rape; and second, Mr. Nichols asserted that his case presented a corpus 
delicti issue if the alleged victim did not testify at trial. (Tr., p.8, L.i0 - p.i8, L.i5.) 
However, because Mr. Nichols was not personally present for this hearing, the district 
court delayed any ruling on these issues. (Tr., p.6, L.ii - p.?, L.24, p.i8, L.i? - p.i9, 
L.?) 
Following this hearing, the State submitted two sets of briefing - one addressing 
the issue of corpus delicti and one providing supplemental authority regarding the 
potential defenses at trial of consent and/or mistake of age. (R., pp.46-52.) Regarding 
the corpus delicti issue, the State asserted that the testimony of the alleged victim was 
not necessary in order to establish the corpus delicti of the offense in this case. 
(R., pp.46-4?) But the only "corroboration" of Mr. Nichols' confession offered up by the 
State was that he was living with the alleged victim at the time that a police officer was 
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dispatched to his home 1 and that the alleged victim's mother stated to police that she 
came to Idaho from her home in Washington State in order to retrieve the alleged 
victim. (R., p.47.) 
Regarding Mr. Nichols' intent to claim consent and/or reasonable mistake 
regarding age as a defense, the State asserted that the primary case relied upon by 
Mr. Nichols in his argument, Lawrence v. Texas, was inapposite to his claim because 
the Lawrence Opinion's holding was expressly limited to private, consensual encounters 
between adults. (R., pp.49-51.) The State also provided the district court with case law 
from other jurisdictions reaching a similar conclusion. (R., pp.50-51.) 
The district court took up the issues relating to the State's motion in limine on the 
day of trial. The court granted the State's motion in limine to preclude Mr. Nichols from 
raising any defense as to good faith mistake regarding the alleged victim's age, or 
raising any defense of consent. (Tr., p.26, L.21 p.31, L.5.) However, the court did not 
address the issue previously raised by Mr. Nichols regarding the absence of any 
evidence or corroboration of the corpus delicti of the charged offense aside from his 
confession. (Tr., p.26, L.21 - p.31, L.15.) 
The State presented only three witnesses at trial. The first was Melody Fairfax, 
K.F.'s adopted mother. (Tr., p.50, L.3 - p.51, L.6.) Ms. Fairfax was not present when 
K.F. was born. (Tr., p.51, Ls.14-19.) She was only told that K.F. was approximately 10 
months old when Ms. Fairfax adopted K.F.; and she further testified that, as part of the 
1 This Court may wish to note that this purported "corroboration" - i.e. that K.F. and 
Mr. Nichols were living together - was itself only evinced by Mr. Nichols' statements and 
confession to law enforcement, and therefore this would not constitute "corroboration" of 
the same confession. 
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adoption process, she was given a birth certificate for K.F. that listed her date and place 
of birth. (Tr., p.51, L.3 p.52, L.i8.) Mr. Nichols objected to the testimony regarding 
K.F.'s birth date on hearsay grounds, but the district court originally held that this was 
not hearsay. (Tr., p.53, Ls.2-22.) 
Ms. Fairfax also testified that K.F. was diagnosed with schizoaffective disorder 
and Asperger's Syndrome. (Tr., p.54, Ls.1-9.) Unfortunately, K.F. apparently would 
refuse to take her medications for these conditions and frequently ran away from home. 
(Tr., p.54, Ls.i0-i7.) K.F. had apparently run away from home prior to being found at 
Mr. Nichols' residence in Idaho. (Tr., p.54, L.18 p.56, L.7.) In fact, at the time of trial 
K.F. had again run away from home and her whereabouts were unknown. (Tr., p.57, 
Ls.5-6.) By Ms. Fairfax's estimation, K.F. had run away from home between 15-20 
times in the past. (Tr., p.66, L.25 - p.67, L.8.) Ms. Fairfax further testified that she was 
at the point where she refused to report K.F. as missing to law enforcement given her 
history for running away. (Tr., p.66, L.25 - p.67, L.8.) 
The second witness for the State was Detective Ty Larsen, who was a detective 
with the Mountain Home police department. (Tr., p.68, L.22 - p.69, L.23.) Detective 
Larsen testified that he contacted Mr. Nichols after receiving a report that Mr. Nichols 
might be living with a potential runaway. (Tr., p.70, L.8 - p.71, LA.) Upon being 
contacted, Mr. Nichols agreed to come in to the police station for an interview. 
(Tr., p.71, Ls.15-22.) 
According to the officer, Mr. Nichols admitted that he and K.F. were residing 
together in a two-bedroom apartment for about one month. (Tr., p.85, L.25 - p.86, 
L.22.) Mr. Nichols stated to the officer that he had come to Idaho from Washington 
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state, and that K.F. had moved with him. He further allegedly admitted that he and K.F. 
were involved in a dating relationship. (Tr., p.86, L.23 p.87, L.~18.) 
Detective Larsen provided the only testimony at a" during the trial that indicated 
any sexual relationship between K.F. and Mr. Nichols, and this came solely from 
Mr. Nichols' alleged confessions to the officer. The detective testified that Mr. Nichols 
admitted to engaging in sexual intercourse as part of this dating relationship. (Tr., p.88, 
L.8 - 89, L.8.) But Detective Larsen never verified at a" that the two were, in fact, living 
together in Idaho. (Tr., p.94, L.24 p.95, L.8.) 
The final witness presented by the State was another police officer Officer 
Humberto Fuentes, also with the Mountain Home police department. (Tr., p.98, L.22 
p.99, L.2.) Officer Fuentes was the officer who first responded to a dispatch regarding a 
potential runaway. (Tr., p.100, L.18 - p.101, L.2.) When the officer arrived at 
Mr. Nichols' house, he observed Mr. Nichols and K.F. sitting underneath a tree in the 
front yard of the residence. (Tr., p.103, Ls.5-9.) K.F. appeared to be upset and crying, 
and Mr. Nichols was trying to comfort her. (Tr., p.103, Ls.12-17.) Officer Fuentes 
talked to Mr. Nichols, who a"egedly told the officer that he and K.F. resided at the 
apartment together and had moved there from Washington. (Tr., p.103, L.24 - p.105, 
L.6.) After confirming that K.F. was a runaway, Officer Fuentes placed her in custody 
and called her mother. (Tr., p.107, L.19-p.109, L.22.) 
The officer never saw any identification from K.F. that listed a birth date and had 
no personal knowledge of her age. (Tr., p.111, Ls.3-19.) 
After the testimony of Officer Fuentes, Mr. Nichols moved the district court 
pursuant to Idaho Criminal Rule 29 (hereinafter, Rule 29) for a judgment of acquittal on 
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the basis that the State had failed to establish the corpus delicti of the charged offense. 
(Tr., p.116, L.10 - p.123, L.5.) The district court denied this motion and held that no 
independent proof of intercourse was actually required in order to establish the corpus 
delicti of the charged offense. (Tr., p.120, L.14 - p.123, L.5.) And so the jury was never 
instructed regarding corpus delicti. (Tr., p.133, L.g - p.140, L.22.) 
The district court did provide a non-pattern jury instruction with regard to the 
statutory elements of statutory rape in Idaho. (Tr., p.135, L.13 - p.136, L.1.) However, 
the court's instruction failed to inform the jurors that they had to find that Mr. Nichols had 
penetrated K.F. with his penis - they merely instructed the jurors that any finding of 
vaginal penetration would suffice. (Tr., p.135, L.13 - p.136, L.1.) 
During closing arguments, the prosecutor made several statements 
characterizing the testimony that was provided at trial. In the process, the prosecutor 
misstated the testimony of both Detective Larsen and Officer Fuentes, referring to facts 
that were not in evidence at trial. With regard to Detective Larsen, the prosecutor stated 
that the detective had testified that Mr. Nichols and K.F. had "both slept in one bed," in 
the same room during the time that K.F. was alleged to have lived with Mr. Nichols. 
(Tr., p.146, L.22.) As to Officer Fuentes' testimony, the prosecutor told the jury that: 
During the course or based upon what he learned from the interview with 
[K.F.], he felt that something wasn't right. And because he felt something 
wasn't right about what he heard, he then passed his report on to the 
detective division so further investigation could be performed. 
(Tr., p.143, Ls.15-21.) Contrary to the representations of the State, Officer Fuentes 
never testified about feeling "something wasn't right," based upon the statements of K.F. 
The jury convicted Mr. Nichols of statutory rape. (Tr., p.164, L.16 - p.167, L.5; 
R., p.68.) After the trial had already concluded, the district court returned to its earlier 
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ruling with regard to K.F.'s mother's testimony regarding K.F.'s date of birth. (R., p.73.) 
Although acknowledging that, at trial, the court had characterized this testimony as "not 
hearsay," the district court amended this conclusion and instead found that this 
testimony fell within an exception to the hearsay rule. (R., p.73.) Specifically, the court 
found that this testimony fell within the exception for reputation concerning personal or 
family history provided under !.R.E. 803(19). (R., p.73.) The district court entered its 
memorandum regarding this ruling apparently in order to "augment" the court's prior 
ruling. (R., p.73.) 
The district court sentenced Mr. Nichols to 10 years, with two years fixed, and 
retained jurisdiction over his case. (4/2/10 Tr., p.33, L.4 - p.34, L.1; R., pp.90-92.) 
Prior to the expiration of the district court's period of retained jurisdiction, the court 
relinquished jurisdiction over Mr. Nichols' case and executed his sentence without 
reduction. (Tr., p.208, Ls.12-18; R., pp.113-114.) Thereafter, Mr. Nichols filed a timely 
Idaho Criminal Rule 35 (hereinafter, Rule 35) motion seeking a reduction of his 
sentence, which was denied by the district court without a hearing. (Motion for 
Correction or Reduction of Sentence, Augment; Memorandum Decision on Defendant's 
Motion for Reduction of Sentence, Augment.) Mr. Nichols timely appealed from the 
district court's order re-imposing his sentence and relinquishing jurisdiction. 
(R., pp.116-119.) 
During the pendency of this appeal, this Court granted the State's petition for 
review in State v. Suriner and further granted Mr. Nichols' motion to stay appellate 
proceedings pending a decision from this Court regarding the corpus delicti issue in that 
2 State v. Suriner, 154 Idaho 81 (2013). 
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case. Thereafter, in a published opinion, the Idaho Court of Appeals affirmed 
Mr. Nichols' judgment of conviction and sentence for statutory rape. (Opinion, pp.1-18.) 
This petition for review timely followed. 
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ISSUES 
1. Should this Court grant Mr. Nichols' petition for review? 
2. Did the district court err when it denied Mr. Nichols' Rule 29 motion seeking a 
judgment of acquittal because the State presented insufficient evidence to 
establish the corpus delicti independent of Mr. Nichols' confessions and 
statements? 
3. Did the district court err when it permitted the introduction of inadmissible 
hearsay in order to establish the age of the alleged victim in this case? 
4. Did the district court's jury instructions in this case impermissibly lower the 
State's burden of proof, and therefore constitute fundamental error, when the 
district court provided an elements instruction for the offense of statutory rape 
that omitted an essential element and when the district court failed to sua sponte 
instruct the jury regarding corpus delicti? 
5. Did the prosecutor commit misconduct, rising to the level of a fundamental error, 
when the prosecutor misstated the testimony provided at trial and introduced 




This Court Should Grant Mr. Nichols Petition For Review And Reverse His Judgment Of 
Conviction For Statutory Rape In Light Of The Errors That Occurred At His Trial 
Although left unaddressed by the Idaho Court of Appeals' opinion, Mr. Nichols' 
case presents an important issue that is left unresolved by that opinion: whether this 
Court's prior ruling in Suriner, which abolished the corpus delicti rule in Idaho, can be 
retroactively applied to those defendants whose trials occurred prior to the issuance of 
that decision. (See Opinion, p.3 n.3 (indicating that the Court of Appeals would not 
resolve this issue in light of its disposition that sufficient proof of corroboration existed at 
trial).) Mr. Nichols asks that this Court grant his petition for review and clarify that, 
under due process principles, this Court's ruling in Suriner eliminating the corpus delicti 
rule, is prospective in application. 
It is well established that the constitutional prohibition against ex post facto laws 
precludes a legislative enactment from being applied retroactively to a criminal 
defendant where that action, among other things, operates so as to alter the legal rules 
of evidence so as to receive different or less testimony than the law required at the time 
of the commission of the alleged offense. See, e.g., Carmel! v. Texas, 529 U.S. 513, 
521-522 (2000); Collins v. Youngblood, 497 U.S. 37, 41-42 (1990). Although the ex 
post facto clauses of the State and federal constitutions apply by their terms only to 
legislative enactments and provisions, the Fifth Amendment of the United States 
Constitution provides similar protections with regard to judicial actions that operate in a 
similar manner. Marks v. United States, 430 U.S. 188, 191-192 (1977). This due 
process protection emanates from the Fifth Amendment of the United States 
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Constitution, and "is based on the notion that persons have the right to fair warning of 
that conduct which will give rise to criminal penalties." Id.; see also State v. 
Shackelford, 150 Idaho 355, 374 n.8 (2010). 
The United States Supreme Court made this clear in Bouie v. City of Columbia, 
378 U.S. 347 (1964). In Bouie, the Court held that, "[t]here can be no doubt that a 
deprivation of the right of fair warning can result not only from vague statutory language 
but also from an unforeseeable and retroactive judicial expansion of narrow and precise 
statutory language." Bouie, 378 U.S. at 352. The Bouie Court further expanded on the 
nature of such a due process violation when a reviewing court unexpectedly alters the 
common law to a defendant's detriment: 
Indeed, an unforeseeable judicial enlargement of a criminal statute, 
applied retroactively, operates precisely like an ex post facto law, such as 
Art. I, § 10, of the Constitution forbids. An ex post facto law has been 
defined by this Court as one "that makes an action done before the 
passing of the law, and which was innocent when done, criminal; and 
which punishes such action" or "that aggravates a crime, or makes it 
greater than it was, when committed." If a state legislature is barred by 
the Ex Post Facto Clause from passing such a law, it must follow that a 
State Supreme Court is barred by the Due Process Clause from achieving 
precisely the same result by judicial construction. The fundamental 
principle that "the required criminal law must have existed when the 
crime occurred" must apply to bar retroactive criminal prohibitions 
emanating from courts as well as from legislatures. If a judicial 
construction of a criminal statute is "unexpected and indefensible by 
reference to the law which had been expressed prior to the conduct in 
issue," it must not be given retroactive effect. 
Id. at 353-354 (internal citations omitted) (emphasis added). 
Subsequent to Bouie, the United States Supreme Court recognized that this due 
process protection extends not only to judicial interpretations of statutes, but also to 
judicial alterations of protections that existed only at common law. See Rogers v. 
Tennessee, 532 U.S. 451 (2001). The Court in Rogers held that a judicial alteration of 
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the prior existing common law cannot be retroactively applied under the Due Process 
Clause of the Fifth Amendment where that alteration is "unexpected and indefensible by 
reference to the law which had been expressed prior to the conduct at issue." Id. at 
462. In making this determination, the Rogers Court looked to factors such as whether 
the common law at issue retained current justification for its on-going existence, 
whether it had been given meaningful effect in prior decisions (as opposed to being 
mentioned in passing and as dicta), whether the common law rule involved a 
substantive right, and whether the alteration of the reviewing court was consistent with 
the actions undertaken in other jurisdictions. Id. at 462-467. 
Although the standard articulated in Rogers with regard to when a due process 
violation is established is broad in its sweep, the prior Opinion in Bouie which formed 
the basis for the Rogers Opinion - provides clearer guidance. In Bouie, the U.S. 
Supreme Court clarified that, "[w]hen a state court overrules a consistent line 
procedural decisions with the retroactive effect of denying a litigant a hearing in a 
pending case, it thereby deprive him of due process of law 'in its primary sense of an 
opportunity to be heard and to defend (his) substantive right.'" Bouie, 378 U.S. at 354 
(quoting Brinkerhoff-Faris Trust and Sav. Co. v. Hill, 281 U.S. 673, 678 (1930)) 
(emphasis added). In other words, where there is an established line of case law 
wherein a substantive right has been recognized by the courts, an abrupt departure 
from this consistent set of holdings cannot be retroactively applied to a criminal 
defendant under the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment. See Lancaster v. 
Metrish, 683 F.3d 740, 744 (6th Cir. 2012). 
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It was this standard that led the Supreme Court of Colorado to conclude that its 
judicial abrogation of the corpus delicti requirement could not be applied retroactively 
under due process principles. In People v. LaRosa, the Supreme Court of Colorado 
had occasion to revisit the on-going viability of the corpus delicti rule in the context of a 
case where the only corroboration of a defendant's confession of sexual assault was the 
opportunity for the defendant to have committed the offense. People v. LaRosa, 293 
P.3d 567, 570-579 (Colo. 2013). After a discussion of the roots of the corpus delicti rule 
under the Colorado common law, the Colorado Supreme Court ultimately abandoned 
this rule in favor of a more general trustworthiness standard. Id. However, this did not 
end the discussion regarding the disposition of the LaRosa case: the Colorado Supreme 
Court still had to resolve whether this alteration could be applied retroactively under the 
Due Process Clause. 
The LaRosa Court determined that it could not. In LaRosa, the Court first 
distinguished the abolition of the corpus delicti rule from the common law rule at issue in 
the Rogers Opinion. LaRosa, 293 P.3d at 578-579. In particular, the LaRosa Court 
noted that the common law rule at issue in Rogers was characterized as a "substantive 
principle" of law, "'in name only' because it had never been enforced" in any state court 
decision, and "had never served as a ground of decision in any homicide prosecution in 
the State and had only been mentioned in three cases, each time in dicta." Id. at 579 
(quoting Rogers, 532 U.S. at 464). Although recognizing that the corpus delicti rule 
had been subject to some criticism, the Colorado Supreme Court nevertheless 
recognized that the rule had been in actual force in several jurisdictions, including the 
court's own prior decisions. Id. In fact, the LaRosa Court noted that the corpus delicti 
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rule had been the substantive law in Colorado for over one hundred years. Id. 
Accordingly, because overturning this rule was a clear, and therefore unexpected, break 
from well-established case law, the Court in LaRosa held that it would violate due 
process to apply the elimination of this rule to those whose convictions arose prior to its 
decision. As such, the Court in LaRosa reversed the defendant's conviction. Id. 
Similarly, the Supreme Court of Utah has also held that it would be 
unconstitutional to apply the elimination of its common law corpus delicti rule 
retroactively to those whose offenses arose prior to the court's decision. See State v. 
Mauchley, 67 P.3d 477 (Utah 2003). Moreover, the conclusion that the elimination of 
the corpus delicti rule cannot be retroactively applied is consistent with prior decisions 
from the Supreme Court of Idaho in a related context. 
In State v. Byers, this Court eliminated the common law requirement of 
corroboration of an alleged victim's allegation of rape in prosecutions for this offense. 
State v. Byers, 102 Idaho 159, 160-165 (1981). However, in doing so this Court 
recognized that it was altering the quantum of proof required in order to establish this 
offense. Id. at 165-167. In light of this, the Byers Court held that the corroboration rule 
must be followed with regard to the defendant in that case, along with those who were 
tried prior to the issuance of the Court's opinion. Id. 
The Court in Byers so held because, "[t]o apply today's decision in passing on 
the validity of Byers' conviction would be the equivalent of applying an ex post facto law, 
and is within the prohibitions of Article I, § 10 of the United States Constitution and Art. 
I, § 16 of our Idaho Constitution." Id. at 166. The Byers Court recognized that the 
elimination of the corroboration requirement, "alters the rules of evidence such that 'less 
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or different testimony than the law required at the time of the commission of the offense 
(is necessary) in order to convict the offender.'" Id. (quoting Bouie, 378 U . at 354) 
(alterations in the original). In light of this, the Byers Court held that the newly 
announced rule eliminating the corroboration requirement, "is to be applied 
prospectively to criminal trials commenced hereafter." Id. at 167. 
As with Byers, Idaho courts prior to Suriner had consistently recognized the 
corpus delicti rule in Idaho - dating back over one hundred years to its adoption in 
State v. Keller in 1902.3 See, e.g., State v. Tiffany, 139 Idaho 909 (2004); State v. Urie, 
92 Idaho 71 (1968); State v. Keller, 8 Idaho 699 (1902); State v. Roth, 138 Idaho 820 
(Ct. App. 2003). And, like LaRosa, this rule was not one that had never had substantive 
force in Idaho the requirements of corpus delicti were unequivocally recognized as 
part of the State's burden of proof of the charged offense at trial. See, e.g., Thomas v. 
State, 145 Idaho 765, 771 (Ct. App. 2008); Roth, 138 Idaho at 822. 
Moreover, the elimination of the corpus delicti rule in Idaho under Suriner was 
particularly unexpected, given that the this Court has left no standard of corroboration in 
its wake in order for a conviction to be sustained on the basis of a confession alone. In 
eliminating the corpus delicti rule in Idaho, this Court in Suriner held that: 
Because the harm caused by the rule exceeds whatever benefits there 
may be, we hold that the corpus delicti rule no longer applies in Idaho. 
We see no reason to attempt to fashion another rule to take its place. 
Instead, the jury can give a defendant's extrajudicial confession or 
statement whatever weight it deems appropriate along with all of the other 
evidence when deciding whether the State has proved guilt beyond a 
reasonable doubt. 
3 By appellate counsel's count, there are approximately 70 cases in Idaho that have 
analyzed and applied the corpus delicti rule in Idaho as part of its substantive law. For 
sake of brevity, only a sampling of cases are cited herein. 
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Suriner, 154 Idaho at 88 (emphasis added). 
This represents a drastic departure, not only from over a hundred years of prior 
established jurisprudence in Idaho, but with the general requirements for admission of 
or use of a confession in order to establish guilt throughout the country. "Courts adhere 
universally to the principle that 'an extrajudicial confession, by itself, is not 
sufficient to sustain a conviction for a crime.'" Mauchley, 67 P.3d 477, 481 (quoting 
State v. Weldon, 314 P.2d 353, 354 (1957)) (emphasis added). This nearly universal 
requirement of additional corroboration was further reflected in LaRosa, wherein the 
Supreme Court of Colorado recognized that, "[a]lmost all courts adhere to a 
corroboration requirement, which requires the prosecution to present corroborating 
evidence of a defendant's confession to either allow for its admission into evidence or 
sustain a conviction." LaRosa, 293 P.3d 567, 571 (emphasis added). 
Although the modem trend has been to adopt a general trustworthiness standard 
with regard to the admission and use of criminal confessions, the fact remains that 
some requirement of corroboration remains in nearly all jurisdictions with regard to a 
defendant's confessions. Accordingly, the Opinion in Suriner also represents a 
departure from the case law in nearly all jurisdictions in that there is now no standard 
that has supplanted corpus delicti in ensuring the reliability and factual corroboration of 
a criminal confession - or its use as the sole proof of guilt in a criminal case. 
Finally, a clear indication that the elimination of corpus delicti in Idaho should not 
be retroactively applied comes from this Court Suriner itself. In the Suriner Opinion, this 
Court did not apply its decision to eliminate the corpus delicti rule to the defendant's 
own case - rather, the Court first analyzed whether the traditional legal standards of 
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corpus delicti had been met in the defendant's case before proceeding to eliminate the 
rule, Suriner, 154 Idaho at 1095-1098. This indicates that the elimination of the corpus 
delicti rule was not intended by this Court to operate retroactively. Mr. Nichols asks that 
this Court expressly make this clear and grant his petition for review. 
In addition, Mr. Nichols submits that the Court of Appeals' Opinion, applying the 
corpus delicti rule, is likely not in accord with prior decisions from this Court regarding 
the minimum standards of evidence for the corroboration requirement of this rule. 
The Court of Appeals' Opinion in this case indicates that mere presence with the 
alleged victim or the opportunity to commit the offense of statutory rape is sufficient to 
meet with the corroboration requirement of the corpus delicti rule. (Opinion, pp.8-9.) 
This holding is in error. In order to establish the corpus delicti of the charged offense in 
Idaho, the State bears the burden to show either the charged injury or the criminal 
agency - and the mere opportunity to commit the charged offense does not meet either 
prong. See Roth, 138 Idaho at 822-823; LaRosa, 293 P.3d at 571-579; People v. 
Robson, 80 P.3d 912, 913 (Colo. App. 2003); State v. Campbell, 178 P.3d 337, 340 (Or. 
Ct. App. 2008); State v. Ray, 926 P.2d 904, 907 (Wash. 1996). The reason behind this 
was stated succinctly by the Oregon Court of Appeals in Campbell - "The evidence 
showing that defendant had an opportunity to commit the offenses establishes only 
that-that he had the opportunity; it does not tend to establish that the offenses actually 
occurred." Campbell, 178 P.3d at 340. 
Likewise, the notion that there existed additional "corroboration" due to the 
circumstances under which Mr. Nichols was found in the alleged victim's presence is 
similarly misplaced. While there was testimony as to the alleged victim's age and 
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Mr. Nichols' the only as any actual relationship between them in the 
comes directly from Mr. Nichols' own confession to the police. (See Tr., p.85, 
L.7 p.8?, L.24; p.95, L.9 98, L.1.) The corpus delicti rule requires that the 
corroboration come from a source aside from the confession itself. See Suriner, 154 
Idaho at 83. As was noted by this Court in Suriner, the corpus delicti rule requires 
that, '''there must be some evidence or corroborating circumstances tending to show 
that a crime has been committed, confessions or statements." Id. 
While multiple confessions to third parties may suffice for this rule, using the confession 
to "corroborate" itself does not. /d. at 1095-1098. Otherwise, there would be no 
corroboration requirement at all to the corpus delicti rule - mere intemal consistency 
would suffice. 
The State failed to establish any proof of the corpus delicti of the charged offense 
in this case, as was their burden of proof at trial. Accordingly, Mr. Nichols asks that this 
Court grant his petition for review in this case. 
II. 
The District Court Erred When It Denied Mr. Nichols' Rule 29 Motion Seeking A 
Judgment Of Acquittal Because The State Presented Insufficient Evidence To Establish 
The Corpus De/icW Of The Charged Offense Independent Of Mr. Nichols' Confessions 
And Statements 
A. Introduction 
Corpus delicti principles require that the State, as part of its burden of proof of 
any criminal offense, provide some quantum of evidence independent of a confession to 
demonstrate either the injury underpinning the offense or the criminality of the alleged 
action. With regard to statutory rape, both the injury and the criminality aspects of this 
18 
offense require proof of intercourse. There was no evidence aside from Mr. Nichols' 
alleged confession that corroborated that any intercourse occurred between Mr. Nichols 
and K.F. Given this, the district court erred when it denied Mr. Nichols' Idaho Criminal 
Rule 29 motion seeking a judgment of acquittal based upon the failure of the State to 
prove the corpus delicti of the charged offense. 
B. Standard Of Review 
On review of the district court's denial of an Idaho Criminal Rule 29 motion 
seeking a judgment of acquittal, this Court will not reverse a verdict on such grounds 
where every element of the offense is established by substantial and competent 
evidence. See, e.g., State v. Willard, 129 Idaho 827, 828 (Ct. App. 1997). All of the 
inferences from the evidence are viewed in the light most favorable to the State. Id. 
This Court will likewise not overturn a conviction based upon insufficiency of the 
evidence where a rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the 
crime beyond a reasonable doubt, nor will this Court substitute its own view of the 
evidence for that of the jury. See, e.g., State v. Vandenacre, 131 Idaho 507, 510 
(Ct. App. 1998). Further, matters regarding credibility of the witnesses, the weight of 
the testimony, and the reasonable inferences to be drawn therefrom are solely within 
the province of the jury. Id. "A judgment must be reversed, however, if the evidence is 
insufficient to support the conviction." State v. Hughes, 130 Idaho 698, 701 (Ct. App. 
1997). 
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C. The District Court Erred When It Denied Mr. Nichols' Rule 29 Motion Seeking A 
Judgment Of Acquittal Because State Presented Insufficient Evidence To 
Establish The Corpus Delicia Independent Of Mr. Nichols' Confessions And 
Statements 
"A plea of not guilty puts in issue every material allegation of the indictment." 
State v. Cutler, 94 Idaho 295, 296 (1971). One of the material allegations that is placed 
at issue in every criminal offense is the corpus delicti of the charged offense. Id; 
State v. Pullos, 76 Idaho 369,373-374 (1955). The prosecution has the burden of proof 
of the corpus delicti. Id. 
"Corpus delicti, meaning, 'the body of a crime,' is a common law principle that 
requires the state to establish some evidence that a crime occurred independently from 
a defendant's confession." State v. Roth, 138 Idaho 820, 822 (Ct. App. 2003); see also 
Suriner, 154 Idaho at 83. This principle applies both to a defendant's extrajudicial 
admissions, as well as extrajudicial confessions. Roth, 138 Idaho at 822 n.2. For every 
criminal offense, in order to prove the offense at trial, the burden is on the State to prove 
three broad elements: (1) that an injury occurred; (2) that the injury was caused by 
criminal agency; and (3) the identity of the person who caused the injury. Id. at 823. In 
Idaho, the State must present corroborating evidence - other than a confession - of 
either of the first two elements in order to establish the corpus delicti of the charged 
offense. Id. Only slight corroboration by independent evidence is required. Id. 
However, the corroboration must relate to establishing either the injury or that the injury 
was produced by criminal agency. See a/so Thomas v. State, 145 Idaho 765, 771 
(Ct. App. 2008). 
As this offense existed at the time of Mr. Nichols' trial, Idaho defined statutory 
rape as the penetration, however, slight, of the oral, anal or vaginal opening with the 
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perpetrator's penis accomplished with a female who is under the age of 18.4 See 
§ 18-6101 (1) (2010) (amended by L. 2010, ch. § eff.July1,2010;S.L. 
2010, ch. 352, § 1, eff. July 1, 2010). The "injury" addressed by this statute is sexual 
intercourse; and the "criminality" is proof of sexual intercourse with a female who is 
under the age of 18. Under this statutory scheme, the injury and the criminality prongs 
of this offense are partly co-extensive. Both require some independent proof or 
corroboration of the act of sexual intercourse. See also State v. Smith, 265 P. 666, 667 
(1928) (holding that corpus delicti of statutory rape is proof of intercourse). 
In this case, there is absolutely no corroboration of any sexual intercourse 
between Mr. Nichols and K.F. independent of his confession or admissions. K.F. did 
not testify at trial. There was no forensic or medical examination of K.F. presented as 
evidence to the jury. Law enforcement officers did not even verify that K.F. and 
Mr. Nichols were, in fact, living together - the only evidence of that came from the same 
confession wherein Mr. Nichols allegedly admitted to sexual intercourse. (Tr., p.86, 
Ls.3-22.) There is, in this case, nothing at all that would corroborate that sexual 
intercourse occurred between Mr. Nichols and K.F. aside from Mr. Nichols' confession. 
Because the corpus delicti doctrine requires corroboration of sexual intercourse in 
support of a finding of either injury or criminality with regard to the offense of statutory 
rape, and because there was no corroboration of this aspect of Mr. Nichols' confession 
at all at trial, the district court erred in this case when it denied Mr. Nichols' Rule 29 
4 The Idaho State legislature has subsequently amended Idaho's rape statute - and, in 
particular, Idaho's formulation of statutory rape - in 2010. The amended statute now 
makes two separate provisions regarding statutory rape, and defines the offense in 
terms of the differential in age between the alleged victim and the alleged perpetrator. 
See I.e. §§ 18-6101(1), (2). 
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motion seeking a judgment of acquittal. Therefore, Mr. Nichols' conviction for statutory 
rape must be dismissed with prejudice. 
III. 
The District Court Erred When It Permitted, Over Mr. Nichols' Objection, The 
Introduction Of Inadmissible Hearsay In Order To Establish The Age Of The Alleged 
Victim In This Case 
A. Introduction 
The sole testimony presented in this case as to K.F.'s age at the time of the 
alleged sexual intercourse - which is an essential element to the charge of statutory 
rape in Idaho - came in the form of hearsay testimony from two of the three witnesses 
for the State. Mr. Nichols submits that this testimony was erroneously admitted by the 
district court and, because this hearsay was the sole evidence of one of the essential 
elements of the charged offense in this case, this error was not harmless. 
B. Standard Of Review 
Where a defendant makes a contemporaneous objection as to the admission of 
evidence, this Court employs an abuse of discretion standard. See, e.g., State v. Perry, 
150 Idaho 209, 218 (2010). This standard involves a three-part inquiry: (1) whether the 
district court correctly perceived the issue as one of discretion; (2) whether the trial court 
acted within the proper boundaries of its discretion and consistent with the legal 
standards attendant on that discretion; and (3) whether the district court reached its 
decision through an exercise of reason. Id. In every case where the defendant objects 
to the error before the district court, the defendant bears the initial burden to establish 
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that error occurred, but the State bears the burden to establish, beyond a reasonable 
doubt, that the error was harmless. Id. at 222. 
C. The District Court Erred When It Permitted, Over Mr. Nichols' Objection, The 
Introduction Of Inadmissible Hearsay In Order To Establish The Age Of The 
Alleged Victim In This Case 
1. The District Court Erroneously Admitted Hearsay Testimony From K.F.'S 
Adopted Mother Because There Was Insufficient Foundation For 
Admission Of This Testimony Under I.R.E. 803(19) 
The district court in this case initially - and erroneously - ruled that Ms. Fairfax's 
testimony regarding K.F.'s purported date of birth was not hearsay, and therefore 
allowed this testimony to be admitted at trial for proof of the matter asserted. (Tr., p.53, 
Ls.2-22.) Likely in recognition of its error, the district court entered a memorandum 
several days after the jury's verdict in this case "augmenting" the record to alter this 
ruling. (R., p.73.) As an alternative basis for allowing the testimony of K.F.'s adopted 
mother as to K.F.'s birth date, the court concluded that such testimony fell within the 
hearsay exception for reputation concerning personal or family history contained in 
!.R.E.803(19). Mr. Nichols asserts that either ruling on the part of the district court was 
error. 
The Idaho Supreme Court has recently artiCUlated the limitations attendant on 
the district court's discretion with regard to admissibility determinations regarding the 
Idaho Rules of Evidence. The Court in State v. Watkins cited with approval the 
following statement of law on such issues: 
The law of evidence is structured by rules, forged by centuries of 
experience and continually tested against evolving notions of fairness and 
truth-seeking. Our Supreme Court recently has adopted a detailed and 
painstakingly drafted formulation of such rules. See Idaho Rules of 
23 
Evidence (effective July 1,1985). rules are not merely 
guides to discretion; they are standards controlling the outcome 
judge possesses no "discretionary" 
disregard specific standards~particularly 
standards impart real meaning an 
State v. Watkins, 148 Idaho 418,420-421 (2009) (quoting State v. May/ett, 108 Idaho 
671,674 (Ct. App. 1985) (Burnett, J., specially concurring)) (emphasis added). 
Idaho Rule of Evidence 801 defines "hearsay" as, "a statement, other than one 
made by the declarant while testifying at the trial or hearing, offered into evidence to 
prove the truth of the matter asserted." LRE. 801 (c). While hearsay may not generally 
be introduced into evidence, there are some exceptions to this rule. One such 
exception is a statement regarding reputation concerning personal or family history. 
See LR. 802,803(19). 
Following Mr. Nichols' trial, the district court determined that Ms. Fairfax's 
testimony regarding what she was told as to K.F.'s birth date fell within the hearsay 
exception for reputation concerning personal or family history contained in LRE. 
803(19). (R, p.73.) There does not appear to be any case law in Idaho regarding the 
"reputation concerning personal or family history" exception to the prohibition against 
hearsay. However, this provision is substantially similar to that employed in other 
jurisdictions, and therefore an examination of cases from other jurisdictions regarding 
the requirements under this exception may be instructive for this Court. 
Other jurisdictions have recognized that statements regarding a common familial 
understanding regarding a family member's birth date (or the circumstances of his or 
her birth) is hearsay when not based upon personal knowledge of the witness- but that 
such testimony may fall within the "reputation concerning personal or family history" 
24 
exception to the prohibition against introduction of hearsay evidence. See, e.g., U.S. v. 
Jean-Baptiste, 166 F.3d 102, 110 (2d Cir. 1999). However, for such evidence to be 
admissible for the truth of the matter asserted, a sufficient foundation must be laid. And 
each hearsay link in the chain of communications regarding this matter must also fall 
within a hearsay exception. See !.R.E. 805; Blackburn V. United Parcel Service, Inc., 
179 F.3d 81, 101 n.14 (3d Cir. 1999); State V. Taylor, 240 S.W.3d 789, 799-801 (Tenn. 
2007). In addition, federal case law indicates that, in addition to considerations of 
whether a sufficient foundation has been laid, a trial court should also consider 
additional factors such as how significant the evidence is to the issues disputed at trial, 
the availability of other evidence of the facts testified to, and the nature of the litigation. 
Blackburn, 179 F.3d at 100. 
In this case, while K.F.'s adopted mother is presumably familiar with those facts 
and occurrences within their family from the time that K.F. came to be adopted, her 
mother was not present at the time she was born and had no apparent personal 
knowledge of the circumstances of K.F.'s birth other than what she was told. (Tr., p.50, 
L.18 - p.53, L.22.) Given this, Ms. Fairfax's testimony regarding K.F.'s birth date 
constituted hearsay. Assuming for purposes of argument that testimony from an 
adopted parent regarding the adopted child's birth date falls within the hearsay 
exception contained in !.R.E. 803(19), there was insufficient foundation to establish the 
trustworthiness of the information that K.F. adopted mother relied on as to K.F.'s birth 
date. There was, therefore, an insufficient foundation for the admission of this 
testimony under !.R.E. 803(19). 
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In addition, the district court failed to consider the other relevant factors identified 
by the Blackburn Court with regard to admissibility of hearsay evidence under the 
personal or family reputation exception.5 Blackburn, 179 F.3d at 100. A review of these 
factors likewise militates against the admissibility of this testimony as the sole 
substantive proof of an element of a criminal offense. The significance of this evidence 
was immense for the State - the age of the alleged victim was an essential component 
of its criminal charge and the absence of proof of this element precluded a criminal 
conviction. Given this, greater caution with regard to admission of hearsay testimony 
should have been exercised. 
Second, there were other potential sources of information that were likely more 
reliable, given that the record at trial does not indicate that Ms. Fairfax had any direct, 
personal knowledge of the circumstances of K.F.'s birth. Presumably there was an 
official birth certificate created upon K.F.'s birth, although such a document was not 
admitted at trial. In light of the fact that there was a more reliable and direct source of 
evidence for the fact at issue, this also weighed against the admission of this hearsay 
testimony. 
Finally, the nature of these proceedings also demonstrates that the admission of 
this hearsay was error. As noted in the above-quoted passage from Watkins, in criminal 
trials, the rules of evidence "impart real meaning to an accused's right to a fair trial." 
Watkins, 148 Idaho at 421. Given the heightened interests at stake in criminal 
5 This is quite likely because the district court failed to recognize that this evidence was 
hearsay until after trial. (Compare Tr., p.53, Ls.2-22; R., pp.73-74.) 
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proceedings, the district court should not have admitted this hearsay evidence before 
the jury for the truth of the matters asserted. 
2. The District Court Erred When It Permitted Officer Fuentes To Testify In 
Re-Direct Examination As To Hearsay Regarding K.F.'S Purported Status 
As A Runaway, Despite The Fact That The District Court Had Previously 
Ruled That This Exact Testimony Was Inadmissible Hearsay 
During the State's direct examination of Officer Fuentes, the following exchange 
took place: 
Q: And after speaking to them [a party from the Everett Police 
Department in Washington State], what did you do next? 
A: I confirmed with the state of Washington - there was some 
confusion as to whether or not [K.F.] was a missing person or she 
was a runaway, and I had to clarify which one she was. 
it me that she was, in a 
DEFENSE COUNSEL: I'm going to to hearsay. 
COURT: I'm going to sustain the objection. 
Tr., p.108, LS.8-19. 
At that point, the State moved on to another line of questioning. However, on re-
direct examination, the State sought to introduce an identical line of questioning 
specifically to establish the truth of the matter asserted - i.e., that K.F. was, in fact, a 
runaway as evidence that she was under the age of 18. (Tr., p.111, 1.25 - p.113, 1.2.) 
Oddly, despite the fact that the district court had already determined that this 
evidence was inadmissible hearsay, the court reversed its ruling when Mr. Nichols 
objected on hearsay grounds. (Tr., p.112, 1.21 - p.113, 1.2.) The basis for the court's 
ruling was that the officer, "had already testified to that." (Tr., p.113, Ls.1-2.) This was 
error for two reasons. First, the district court was incorrect in its recollection of the 
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officer's prior testimony - the court had actually sustained the objection to the officer 
testifying as to what he was told regarding whether K.F. was a runaway and therefore 
this testimony was not properly before the jury. 
But second, and more importantly, this evidence was inadmissible hearsay. The 
Idaho Court of Appeals' opinion in State v. Boehner is instructive on this point. See 
State v. Boehner, 114 Idaho 311 (1988). In Boehner, several police officers testified as 
to the substance of a dispatch that they had received that indicated the defendant had 
previously stated that he "wanted to kill a cop." Id. at 313. Defense counsel filed a 
motion in limine prior to trial to exclude this testimony and objected to this testimony as 
hearsay at trial. Id. at 313-314. The district court permitted this testimony to be 
presented at trial. Id. 
The Boehner Court determined that the district court erred when it permitted this 
testimony to be introduced into evidence. Boehner 114 Idaho at 314. First, this 
evidence was not relevant to the case for the non-hearsay purpose identified by the 
district court - the information possessed by the officers at the time that they confronted 
the defendant and how this influenced their actions. Id. at 314. The Boehner Court 
recognized that this was irrelevant to the jurors - while the jury was charged with 
determining the defendant's intent with regard to the charged offense there was no 
aspect of the charge at issue that dealt with the police officers' "collective state of mind." 
Id. 
The only thing that this hearsay testimony was relevant to establish for purposes 
of the charged offense in Boehner - that is, the intent of the defendant - would 
expressly have to embrace the truth of the matter asserted from the police dispatch. Id. 
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at 314-315. Because the only relevance of this evidence of an out-of-court assertion 
required the jurors to first assume the truth of the matter asserted, which is prohibited 
under I.R.E. 802, the Boehner Court held that it was error for this evidence to have been 
admitted attrial. Id. at 315. 
Here, it is abundantly clear that the State was seeking to admit this evidence for 
the truth of the matter asserted. This is apparent in the manner in which the State 
initially attempted to frame the question to Officer Fuentes on re-direct examination. 
The State first asked the officer, "Officer Fuentes, you just testified that you had not 
been provided the age of [K.F.]. was a wouldn't you 
known she was 18?" (Tr., p.111, L.25 - p.112, L.3) (emphasis added.) 
When the officer didn't understand the question, the State later rephrased the question 
to ask specifically whether K.F. was, in fact, a runaway from Washington. (Tr., p.112, 
L.21 - p.113, L.2.) Again, the context of the State's question was to demonstrate the 
truth of the matter asserted in order to show that K.F. was under the age of 18, which 
was an essential element of Mr. Nichols' charged offense. The district court erred when 
it determined otherwise. 
The only proof at all in Mr. Nichols' trial as to the age of the alleged victim came 
solely through hearsay testimony. Mr. Nichols asserts that none of this testimony was 
properly admitted. Moreover, because this testimony was the sole proof of an essential 




The District Court's Jury Instructions In This Case Impermissibly Lowered The State's 
Burden Of Proof, And Constituted Fundamental Error, When The District Court Provided 
An Elements Instruction For The Offense Of Statutory Rape That Omitted An Element 
And When The District Court Failed To Sua Sponte Instruct The Jury Regarding Corpus 
Delicti 
A. Introduction 
The district court's non-pattem elements instruction to the jury omitted the 
element that the State had to prove that Mr. Nichols had penetrated the alleged victim 
with his penis. Additionally, the district court failed to sua sponte instruct the jury 
regarding the State's burden of proof of the corpus delicti of the charged offense, 
particularly in relation to the requirement of some degree of corroboration of the 
underlying alleged injury or criminality. Both omissions relieved the State of its burden 
of proof at trial, and therefore rose to the level of a due process violation, and neither 
omission was harmless. Because of this, the district court's jury instruction errors rose 
to the level of a fundamental error requiring reversal. 
B. Standard Of Review 
Review for fundamental error is reserved for those alleged errors that are of 
constitutional magnitude. Perry, 150 Idaho at 226. In cases of un-objected to, 
fundamental error, a three-part test governs this Court's review. First, the defendant 
must demonstrate that one or more of his or her un-waived constitutional rights were 
violated. Id. Second, the error must be "clear and obvious, without the need for any 
additional information not contained in the appellate record, including information as to 
whether the failure to object was a tactical decision." Id. Finally, the defendant must 
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demonstrate that the error affected his or her substantial rights i.e. that there is a 
reasonable possibility that the error affected the outcome of the trial. Id. 
This Court reviews alleged errors in the jury instructions provided by the district 
court for fundamental error where those errors are of a constitutional magnitude. See, 
e.g., State v. Anderson, 144 Idaho 743, 746-748 (2007). Where the defendant alleges a 
violation of his or her constitutional rights with regard to the trial court's jury instructions, 
this Court will defer to the district court's findings of fact, but reviews de novo the district 
court's application of those facts to the constitutional requirements. Id. at 746. "The 
propriety of jury instructions is a question of law over which this Court exercises free 
review." Id. In reviewing an issue regarding jury instructions, this Court must determine 
whether the instructions, when viewed as a whole, fairly and adequately present the 
issues and state the applicable law. Id. 
C. The District Court's Elements Instruction To The Jury Regarding The Charge Of 
Statutory Rape Omitted An Essential Element Of This Offense, And This 
Omission Constitutes Fundamental Error 
While Idaho Criminal Rule 30(b) generally precludes raising allegations of error 
with regard to jury instructions for the first time on appeal, a reviewing court in Idaho can 
consider such issues if the allegation of error rises to the level of a fundamental error. 
Anderson, 144 Idaho at 748. An instruction that omits any element of the charged 
offense, or otherwise relieves the State of its burden of proof at trial, violates due 
process and may be reviewed by this Court for fundamental error. Id. 
The district court's instruction on this case with regard to the elements instruction 
provided as follows: 
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In order for the defendant to be guilty of Rape, as charged in the 
Information, the State must prove each of the following: 
(1) On or between the 1st day of August 2009 and the 21 st day 
of August 2009 
(2) in the state of Idaho 
(3) the defendant TIMOTHY L. NICHOLS did penetrate the 
vaginal opening of K.F., a female person, and 
(4) K.F. was under the age of eighteen years of age. 
If any of the above has not been proven beyond a reasonable doubt, you 
must find the defendant not guilty. If each of the above has been proven 
beyond a reasonable doubt, then you must find the defendant guilty. 
(Jury Instruction 13, Augment; Tr., p.135, L.13 - p.136, L.1.) 
This instruction was not in conformance with the model pattern jury instruction for 
statutory rape, which directly instructs the jury that they must find the defendant LCIIIIJI~iI::U 
his penis penetrate, however slightly, the vaginal opening of the alleged victim. See 
ICJI 901 (emphasis added). The instruction given by the court omitted the element that 
the penetration was caused by the defendant's penis. As has been noted, at the time 
Mr. Nichols was alleged to have committed statutory rape, Idaho defined statutory rape 
as the penetration, however, slight, of the oral, anal or vaginal opening with the 
perpetrator's penis accomplished with a female who is under the age of 18. See 
I.C. § 18-6101(1) (2010) (amended by S.L. 2010, ch. 235, § 7, eff. July 1, 2010; S.L. 
2010, ch. 352, § 1, eff. July 1, 2010). Given that the district court's instruction omitted a 
statutory element from the charged offense, this was error plain on the face of the 
record. 
The failure of defense counsel to object to this omission was not the product of 
trial strategy. Mr. Nichols pleaded not guilty, thereby putting each and every element of 
32 
the charged offense at issue in his trial. See Cutler, 94 Idaho at 296; I.C. 19-1715. In 
such there is no tactical advantage to be gained from excusing the State of its 
burden of proof. Therefore, the failure to object to this error was not the product of a 
strategic determination on Mr. Nichols' part 
Finally, the omission of this element by the district court was not harmless. The 
test for harmlessness is whether there is a reasonable possibility that this error - the 
omission of a material element could have affected the outcome of the trial. 
Particularly when viewed in conjunction with the absence of any proof of sexual 
intercourse aside from Mr. Nichols' confession to law enforcement, a reasonable juror 
could have easily found in Mr. Nichols' favor with regard to this element. 
D. The District Court Had A Duty To Sua Sponte Instruct The Jury With Regard To 
Proof Regarding The Corpus Delicti Of The Charged Offense, And The Failure 
To Do So Was Fundamental Error As It Reduced The State's Burden Of Proof At 
Trial 
"In charging the jury, the court must state to them all matters of law necessary for 
their information." State v. Pearce, 146 Idaho 241,247 (2008); I.C. § 19-2132(a). While 
there is no duty on the part of the district court to instruct the jury on every theory of the 
defense that a defendant may have, the failure of the district court to sua sponte instruct 
the jury as to a particular point of law may be raised on appeal if the "instruction 
constitutes a necessary matter of law whose omission would constitute fundamental 
error." Id. at 248. An instruction that relieves the State of its burden of proof at trial 
violates due process and may be reviewed by this Court for fundamental error. 
Anderson, 144 Idaho at 748. 
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The district court was well aware of the corpus delicti issue in this case. 
Mr. Nichols had asserted that there would be insufficient independent proof of the 
corpus delicti should the victim not testify at trial at the hearing on the State's motion in 
limine. (Tr., p.i3, L. 7 p.18, L.i5.) The State provided written briefing on this issue 
prior to tria/. (R., pp.46-47.) Finally, the absence of independent proof or corroboration 
of the corpus delicti formed the basis of Mr. Nichols' Rule 29 motion seeking a judgment 
of acquittal. (Tr., p.116, Ls.1 0-23.) Taken together, the district court had abundant 
notice that the absence of independent proof of the corpus delicti of the charged offense 
was a critical dispute in this case, and therefore the jury needed to be instructed on this 
issue. 
In addition, the failure of the district court to instruct the jury regarding corpus 
delicti rose to the level of a due process violation constituting fundamental error 
because this omission reduced the State's burden of proof. As previously noted, one of 
the material allegations at issue in every criminal offense is the corpus delicti of the 
charged offense, and the State bears the burden of proving corpus delicti at trial. 
Cutler, 94 Idaho at 296 State v. Pullos, 76 Idaho 369, 373-374 (1955). However, the 
jury was never told that the State has this burden. 
The jury in this case was never instructed that, in order to sustain a conviction for 
statutory rape, the State was required to produce some independent evidence, aside 
from Mr. Nichols' confession, to corroborate that sexual intercourse occurred in this 
case. (Tr., p.133, L.9 - p.140, L.19.) Moreover, the failure of defense counsel to object 
to the absence of a corpus delicti instruction in this case was not a tactical decision. As 
has been noted, Mr. Nichols argued the absence of proof of corpus delicti prior to trial 
34 
and through a motion for judgment of acquittal at the close of the State's case. 
(Te, p.13, L.7 p.18, L.1 p.116, Ls.10-23.) Given that the absence of any outside 
corroboration was identified by Mr. Nichols as an area of the State's case where there 
was no proof at all to support the State's evidentiary burden, there is no reasonable 
strategic reason why Mr. Nichols would then decline to inform the jury as to the 
requirements of corroboration under the corpus delicti rule. 
In light of this, there is every possibility that the district court's omissions in 
instructing the jury regarding the State's burden of proof of corpus delicti, and as to the 
elements for statutory rape, very likely affected the outcome of the proceedings in 
Mr. Nichols' trial. Such an omission rises to the level of a fundamental error, and 
requires reversal in this case. 
v. 
The Prosecutor Committed Misconduct, Rising To The Level Of A Fundamental Error, 
When The Prosecutor Misstated The Testimony Provided At Trial And Introduced Facts 
Not In Evidence For The Jury's Consideration During Closing Arguments 
A. Introduction 
The prosecutor in Mr. Nichols case argued facts that were never introduced into 
evidence twice during closing arguments. Both sets of facts were prejudicial, and 
tended to bolster the State's allegations in a case that was otherwise largely devoid of 
any proof. Because this argument constitutes an error of a constitutional magnitude, 
that is plain from the record and was not harmless, Mr. Nichols asserts that this 
misconduct constituted fundamental, reversible error. 
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Standard Of Review 
This Court reviews an allegation of prosecutorial misconduct that is not objected 
to trial for fundamental error. Perry, 150 Idaho at 226. As previously noted, a three-
part test govems this Court's review: first, the defendant must demonstrate that one or 
more of his or her un-waived constitutional rights were violated; second, the error must 
be clear and obvious from the record, and not the product of trial strategy; and third, the 
defendant must demonstrate a reasonable possibility that the error affected the 
outcome of the trial. Id. 
C. The Prosecutor Committed Misconduct, Rising To The Level Of A Fundamental 
Error, When The Prosecutor Misstated The Testimony Provided At Trial And 
Introduced Facts Not In Evidence For The Jury's Consideration During Closing 
Arguments 
Mr. Nichols asserts that the prosecutor, at two distinct points during closing 
arguments, argued facts that were not in evidence. Although this misconduct was not 
objected to at trial, Mr. Nichols further asserts that this misconduct rises to the level of a 
fundamental error that is properly justiciable by this Court. 
The purpose of closing arguments is to sharpen and clarify the issues that the 
jury is charged with resolving at trial, to enlighten the jury as to the legal arguments at 
stake, and to help the jurors remember and interpret the evidence. State v. Phillips, 144 
Idaho 82, 86 (Ct. App. 2007). Given the broad nature of this task, both sides have 
traditionally been afforded considerable latitude in presenting their closing arguments to 
the jury. Id. 
"Considerable latitude, however, has its limits, both in matters expressly stated 
and those implied." Id. It is well-established that it constitutes prosecutorial misconduct 
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for the State to argue facts not properly introduced as evidence at trial during closing 
arguments. See, e.g., State v. Griffiths, 101 Idaho 163, 166 (1980) (overruled on other 
grounds by State v. LePage, 102 Idaho 387, 396 (1981 )); State v. Spencer, 74 Idaho 
173,183-184 (1953); State v. Troutman, 148 Idaho 904,911-912 (Ct. App. 2010). As 
was noted by the court in Troutman, "The desire for success should never induce a 
prosecutor to obtain a verdict by argument based upon anything except the evidence in 
the case and the conclusions legitimately deducible from the law applicable to the 
same." Troutman, 148 at Idaho at 908. 
Additionally, the Perry Court has indicated that this type of misconduct rises to 
the level of a due process violation that is properly justiciable under the fundamental 
error doctrine. "Where a prosecutor attempts to secure a verdict on any factor other 
than the law as set forth in the jury instructions and the evidence admitted during trial, 
including reasonable inferences that may be drawn from that evidence, this impacts a 
defendant's Fourteenth Amendment right to a fair trial." Perry, 150 Idaho at 227. 
In this case, the prosecutor referred to facts that were never introduced into 
evidence at two separate points during his closing argument. The first instance came 
as the prosecutor was setting forth the testimony of Officer Fuentes. In discussing the 
officer's discussion with K.F., the prosecutor characterized the officer's testimony as 
follows: 
During the course or based upon what he leamed from that interview with 
[K.F.], he felt something wasn't right. And because he felt something 
wasn't right about what he heard, he passed the report on to the detective 
division so further investigation could be performed. 
Tr., p.143, Ls.15-21. 
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In actuality, there was never any testimony at all about what it was that K.F. told 
Officer Fuentes, and the officer never testified as to having any sort of feeling that 
something "wasn't right," based upon his conversation with K.F. (Tr., p.110, Ls.10-21.) 
The sole testimony that was had was that the officer turned the case over to a detective 
following his interview of K.F. (Tr., p.110, Ls.10-21.) Moreover, in repeatedly stating 
that Officer Fuentes had felt something "wasn't right," based upon the undisclosed 
statements that K.F. made, the prosecutor was inviting the jury to speculate further as to 
what K.F. may have told the officer that would have caused him such concern. 
The second instance of the prosecutor commenting on facts not in evidence dealt 
with the testimony of the other law enforcement officer in this case - Detective Larsen. 
The prosecutor stated that the detective had testified that, not only did Mr. Nichols state 
that he and K.F. shared a bedroom in the apartment that Mr. Nichols resided in, but that 
they both shared the same bed in this room. (Tr., p.146, L.22.) This was not the 
substance of the detective's testimony. Detective Larsen only testified that Mr. Nichols 
had told him that he shared a room with K.F., not that the two slept in the same bed 
within this room. (Tr., p.86, Ls.15-18.) There was no testimony at trial that the detective 
had ever been inside the two-bedroom apartment and had verified that there was only 
one bed in the room that Mr. Nichols allegedly shared with K.F. (Tr., p.68, L.22 - p.98, 
L.3.) 
As previously noted, it is misconduct that constitutes a due process violation for a 
prosecutor to refer to facts never introduced into evidence during closing arguments. 
See Perry, 150 Idaho at 227. This error is also plain on the face of this record, and was 
not the product of any legitimate trial strategy. Mr. Nichols stood to gain absolutely no 
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strategic advantage from the introduction of damaging factual allegations that were 
never subjected to the test of cross~examination during the witnesses' testimony. 
Additionally, there is a reasonable possibility that this misconduct affected the 
outcome of Mr. Nichols' trial. Both statements of alleged facts not in evidence were 
intended to strengthen and reinforce the inference of a romantic and/or sexual 
relationship between Mr. Nichols and K.F. - a relationship for which there was no proof 
at all outside of Mr. Nichols' own confession. There was not even any circumstantial 
proof, aside from the confession, to sustain such a finding. Therefore, the prosecutor's 
allegations of facts not in evidence during closing arguments in this case was directed 
at the question at the heart of the criminal allegations at trial and for which the State had 
virtually no evidence at all. In such circumstances, there is every possibility that this 
type of misconduct affected the outcome of the trial. 
The prosecutor in this case committed misconduct rising to the level of 
reversible, fundamental error when the prosecutor argued prejudicial facts that were 
never admitted into evidence in asking the jury to convict Mr. Nichols of the charged 
offense. Given this, Mr. Nichols asserts that this Court should reverse his conviction for 
statutory rape with prejudice. 
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CONCLUSION 
Mr. Nichols respectfully requests that this Court reverse his conviction for 
statutory rape with prejudice, as there was insufficient evidence of the charged offense. 
In the alternative, Mr. Nichols respectfully requests that this Court reverse his judgment 
of conviction and sentence and remand this case for further proceedings. 
DATED this 28th day of April, 2014. 
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender 
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